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RECENT CASES
the illness from which the addict suffers. The addict will not be
motivated to seek a cure as long as he is receiving narcotcs.15
Some states have adopted the compulsory civil commitment plan
for treating addicts.16 Under this plan the addict is actually confined
to a hospital. During this period he is gradually taken off narcotics
and attempts are made to rehabilitate him. This seems to be a sound
solution to the problem but it is presently impracticable because of
the lack of adequate facilities. The only institutions built especially
to treat addicts are in Lexington, Kentucky, and Forth Worth, Texas;
in addition, a small hospital is maintained in New York City for juve-
niles.17 One reason for this present lack of facilities is that the public
is unaware of the nature and magnitude of the addiction problem. As
long as this unawareness exists, compulsory civil commitment will
remain impracticable.
The status of addiction is a sickness and not a crime. Providing
facilities to cure this sickness is a responsibility of the public. The
state and federal governments should take immediate steps to educate
the public about this problem so that a progressive plan of treatment
and rehabilitaton can be undertaken.
William L. Montague
TOiRTS-STANDAiRD OF CARE FOR MoToRIsTs AT RAILROAD CRossINGs-A
CASE FOR ComPARAIvE NEGLIGENCE-The decedent approached de-
fendant's railroad crossing on a two-lane, paved, county road on a
clear afternoon. Two railroad signs and an official county "stop"
sign were posted to warn motorists of the crossing. From the "stop"
sign, which was ten feet from the nearer of the two tracks, a motorist
could see only 140 feet down the track to the right. Because of weeds
growing on the defendant's right-of-way vision beyond 140 feet was
impossible until the front wheels of the decedents automobile were
almost on the first track. As he was crossing the tracks, his automobile
was struck from the right by the defendant's train which was going
45 miles per hour. There were no eye-witnesses to the actual impact.
The lower court entered judgment for the decedent on the jury s verdict
of $162,121.50. Held: Reversed with directions to enter a judgment
for defendant. Although the defendant was negligent in permitting
the weeds to obscure vision, the court found that the decedent could
15 Ibid.
16 See, e.g., Cal. Welfare & Institutions Code §§5350-61.
17 Eldndge, op. cit. supra note 13, at 113.
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have seen the approaching tram at some indeterminate point between
the "stop" sign and the track, and therefore was contributorily
negligent as a matter of law Louss'lle & Nashville R.R. -v. Fisher,
357 S.W.2d 683 (Ky 1962).
The principal case presents a perfect illustration of the classic
inequity of the doctrine of contributory negligence. Under the holding
of this case, a motorist is barred from recovering any damages if he
negligently fails to discover a tram, although the negligence of the
railroad makes such discovery almost impossible. The Kentucky
Court of Appeals has held that where both parties are guilty of
negligence which concurs m producing the injury complained of,
courts will not stop to inquire which was the most negligent but will
deny recovery if the mury would not have happened but for the
negligence of the plaintiff . The bar is absolute despite the fact that
plaintiff's negligence amounts to only a minute fraction of the total
which contributes to his injury It is an understatement to say that
this result is not the most just, and particularly so when reached in a
system of law which traditionally purports to base liability on fault.
Quoting from Hunt's Adm r v. Chesapeake & 0 Ry.,2 the Court of
Appeals set forth in the principal case what it termed the modem
view of the standard of care of a motorist at a railroad crossing.
In Hunt the court said:
Where the injured party fails to look and listen under circumstances
where an ordinarily prudent man would look and listen, such person
will be guilty of contributory negligence as a matter of law.3
In finding that the decedent failed to look and listen as a reasonable
man would do, the court in the principal case reasoned as follows:
It seems clear the decedent pursued one of two courses. He either
ignored the STOP sign and proceeded over the crossing without
heeding its warning or he stopped (or slowed his vehicle suf-
ficiently), before reacung the track, to appraise the hazard of
proceeding further. If he pursued the first course and completely
ignored the STOP sign and the other warnings of the crossing, he
miust be held negligent as a matter of law. On the other hand, if he
did stop or even slowed his velucle sufficiently to prepare for the
obvious crossing hazard then reasonable minds must conclude
that he did not exercise due care thereafter when he failed to see
or hear the approaching tran. 4
Because of the doctrine of contributory negligence, the court was
compelled to choose one of only two alternatives: full recovery for
I Peerless Mfg. Co. v. Davenport, 281 Kv. a54, 136 S.W.2d 779 (1940).
2254 S.W.2d 705 (Ky 1932).
a1 Id. at 709.
4 Louisville & Nashville R.R. v. Fisher, 357 S.W.2d 683, 689 (Ky. 1962).
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the plaintiff or no recovery at all. A more equitable solution can be
reached by applying the doctrine of comparative negligence, which
permits a choice from many alternatives. Under this doctrine, if the
negligence of both the plaintiff and the defendant contribute to the
plaintiff's injury, the negligence of both parties is compared and the
loss apportioned on the basis of fault. Thus, the plaintiff is not
completely barred because of his negligence, but his recovery is
diminished commensurate with his fault. In the principal case, the
Kentucky court appears to have realized that an application of this
doctrine "in a case of this kind might well accomplish the most just
result."5 However, since Kentucky has not recognized this doctrine,
the court apparently felt bound to use contributory negligence.
The comparative negligence doctrine has been widely accepted
in countries other than the United States. As stated by Prosser:
The United States is virtually the last stronghold of contributory
negligence. The last vestige of the complete defense has disappeared
long since from all of continental Europe which divides the damages.
Great Britain, all of the Canadian provinces, New Zealand and
Western Australia now have come to the same result, so that very
little of the British Empire is left with the common law rule.6
Recently, however, there seems to be a trend toward recognition of
this doctrine in the United States. Mississippi, Nebraska, South
Dakota, Wisconsin, Arkansas, and the Commonwealth of Puerto Rico
now have comparative negligence statutes applicable.to all types of
negligence cases, and since 1951, across-the-board comparative negli-
gence legislation has been introduced in at least 18 states and seriously
considered in at least three more,7 including Kentucky s Even if the
Kentuckv legislature is not willing to adopt across-the-board com-
parative negligence measures, it should take immediate steps toward
preventing the possible recurrence of the result of the principal case.
A state whose example Kentucky could well follow is Florida,
where, by statute, comparative negligence is applied to all cases where
a railroad contributes to a personal injury 9 In one case,' 0 decided
under that statute, with facts very similar to the instant case, the
Florida court held that the plaintiff would be barred unless some
Id.I at 691.
6 Prosser, Comparative Negligence, 41 Calif. L. Rev. 1, 2 (1951).
Malonev, From Contributory to Comparative Negligence: A Needed Law
Reform, 11 Fla. L. Rev. 159 (1958).
8 S.B. 179, Ky. 1954, provided that contributory negligence shall not be a
bar to recovery in torts but shall cause the damages to be dirmshed, but the
bill was rejected by a vote of 28-5 on March 15, 1954. See 1 Legislative Record,
No. 47. Reg. Sess., March 22, 1954.0 Fla. Cen. Laws §§7051(4964), 7052(4965) (1927).
10 Flonda East Coast Ry. v. Townsend, W~14 Fla. 362, 140 So. 196 (1932).
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appreciable negligence of the railroad proximately contributed to his
injury or death in which case the damages awarded should be such
a proportion of the entire damage sustained as defendant's negligence
bears to the combined negligence of both parties. This case aptly
demonstrates the apportionment of loss allowed by comparative
negligence which the Kentucky court said "in a case like this might
well accomplish the most just result."
Harold D Rogers
